

Table of Contents

Bookstore mingling.....	2
Why the academy needs bookstores.....	2
An outsider view.....	2
A gap at the top of theory.....	2
Ink as a witness.....	2
Philosophy 101.....	2
A taxonomy of philosophy.....	2
Social philosophy (and the others).....	2
From Enlightenment to Obscurantism.....	2
Textbook definitions.....	2
Poppers accusation.....	2
Brennans self-incrimination.....	2
Life and times of Herbert Marcuse.....	3
November 1918.....	3
The 1950s: communism in the U.S.A.?	3
The Constructive Forces of Mankind.....	3
The 1960s: the invention of the University.....	3
The goldrush.....	3
Is Marx Marxist?.....	3
Capitalism, Fascism, Marxism.....	3
A new struggle.....	3
Where are the farms and factories?.....	3
The invention of the Middle Class.....	3
Who is afraid of the Middle Class?.....	3
Disney is the enemy.....	3
A new kind of Capital.....	3
Critical theory as a lifestyle.....	3
Engagement as a currency.....	3
The Artist-Academic-Activist continuüm.....	4
The institutions of Cultural Capitalism.....	4
Who isn't a journalist?.....	4
What is art?.....	4
It's the critic, stupid!.....	4
Minister, are you listening?.....	4
Too loved to fail.....	4
Preaching change.....	4
Conservative socialism.....	4
How to get funds.....	4
Communes of commerce.....	4
Silence as art.....	4
When money talks back.....	4
Chop, chop, Chopin!.....	4
The Middle Class as the cultural proletariat.....	4
Why the left hates revolutions now.....	4
Performative protest.....	4
The Therapeutical Turn.....	5
Why we are (not) Freudian.....	5
Is Id a science?.....	5
The Psychoanalysis of social theory.....	5
The Psychoanalysis of science.....	5

The Psychoanalysis of the arts.....	5
The Psychoanalysis of society.....	5
The Psychoanalysis of the past.....	5
Conscienceness as a motive.....	5
Confessions of a Cultural Capitalist.....	5
Vincent Croone.....	5
Laurence Schertz.....	5
Willem de Wolf.....	5
James Lindsay.....	5

Bookstore mingling

Why the Academy needs bookstores

An outsider view

As an outsider, I may be better at researching than researchers, thanks to the abundance of paper I collect. However, I will argue, reading original works and grasping tough concepts does not make one a bearer of cultural capital. Rather, the validation of the institute endows the power of cultural capital on aspiring actors. This is, a university endows knowledge, galleries and editorial houses endow creativity and a newspaper endows truth. This, in short, is the basic tennant of this paper. I will argue this endowment is the capital of our cultural age.

A gap at the top of theory

As an antiquarian rooted in the paper practice of text and literature, I can testify original philosophical texts are hard to find, and thus, hardly read. Whereas philosophical overviews and biographies, textbooks and essays are manifold, the original works of philosophers and social theorists whose names are easily invoked in magazines discussed below are harder to find in the second-hand market. This suggests that original works are not read much, safe from glances at computer screens and copied excerpts. It is beyond the scope of this research to do an in-depth analysis of the circulation and translation of original philosophical works, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that works that are thought to have had a significant influence on the development of theory are hardly read, even by postdoctoral academics.

Ink as a witness

The benefit of using the antiquarian research method in writing is that a great variety of text can testify of times and perspectives that are not usually put forward in research papers. This way, I can put forward documents and texts that may bring an alternative version of events, without invoking the burdensome historical method. Books and papers are not perceived as sources of historical research, but rather as a witnesses in an ongoing debate. The antiquarian method is more ‘casual’ than the historical method. There is no strict division between literature on the one hand and sources on the other. Rather, all handpicked material is put on a pile and consumed in a frantic fashion, where underlining and folding paper is in integral part of the process. Where print books of social theory may be a valuable asset for some, for us antiquarians it is as valuable as a cardboard pizza-

box. It is merely a tool for writing this essay, to be cast away when this thesis is shipped away for peer-review.

The material

In ranking the material from most useful to least useful, I will start with the introduction of the Popper-Marcuse double interview from 1971. In searching for writers of the Frankfurter Schule, only this booklet showed up with the name of one of its members on the cover. Another key publication is 'Universiteit Antwerpen Nu', by mayor of the Belgian city of Antwerp Lode Craeybeckx, published in 1962. The publication is a clear example of Ink as a Witness, as we will later discuss. Thirdly, the non-printed colloquial printed by and for the circle of Belgian psychoanalyst serves as an insider view from above.

For textbooks into social theory both paperback pockets, condemned by Gouldner, as well as a 2007 introductory textbook will do. For an introducing textbook into the broader fields surrounding social theory I have used my own high school philosophy textbook.

Our research will be for a large part limited to magazines of cultural criticism. Here, the effects and affects of cultural capitalism are most clearly at play. Furthermore, to root our research in present day media as well, some podcast will feature. If necessary links to Wikipedia will be shared.

The only monographies I consumed for this study are Freud (*Totem and Taboo*), Gouldner (*The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*)

For a more complete and detailed overview of the used materials see the bibliography at the end of this study.

Philosophy 101

A taxonomy of philosophy

Philosophy, as a discipline, is often categorized in ways that reflect the intellectual priorities of a given era. The taxonomy proposed by D.K.H.C. Kremers in *Denkgen* (2009) offers an alternative structure that emphasizes both historical continuity and pedagogical accessibility. It is this pedagogical model for upper secondary education (4, 5, and 6 VWO) that introduced me to philosophy.

Kremers' taxonomy organizes philosophy into the following key domains: logic, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical anthropology, aesthetics, philosophy of culture and social philosophy. It is but one way to classify philosophy, but the tension in classification is key to understand my argument. Is psychology a science or a philosophy? Is philosophy a school or are all schools branches of philosophy?

We are, in our understanding of understanding, far removed from the Seven Liberal Arts of medieval times.¹ Moreover, most of the seven liberal arts are nowadays subsets of mathematics, physics or linguistics, if thought at all. Since mathematics is just a small school with few students nowadays in the West, it shows that our thinking is already very much socialised. To start somewhere I use my high school paper as a stencil. To introduce a taxonomy of philosophy.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_arts_education

Social philosophy (and the others)

One of the most striking insights derived from Kremers' taxonomy is his framing of the intellectual struggle between the Wiener Kreis (Logical Positivists) and the Frankfurter Schule (Critical Theorists) as a battle between *kennisleer* (epistemology) and *sociale wijsbegeerte* (social philosophy). This is not a mere academic dispute but a fundamental divergence in how we conceive of knowledge, truth, and human agency. Logical positivists sought to establish philosophy as a rigorous, empirical discipline, while the Frankfurt School viewed philosophical inquiry as inherently tied to social critique and political transformation.

This dichotomy is not merely an historical footnote; it shapes contemporary discourse in ways that extend beyond academia. Just as the medieval thinker was bound to the scholastic tradition, so too are contemporary intellectuals bound by the epistemological frameworks forged in the 20th century.

For Kremers, the neglect of metaphysical thought in modern philosophy is a symptom of a broader epistemological shift: a transition from ontological inquiry to discourse analysis, from substance to structure. Yet, as he implicitly argues through his taxonomy, this transition is not without its costs. The abandonment of metaphysical inquiry does not eliminate metaphysical presuppositions; it merely renders them unexamined. Beneath a sea of words may swim a metaphysical whale, and today we will catch it. If our philosophical heritage distinguishes us from the medieval thinker, it is not because we are inherently more enlightened, but because we are shaped by different conceptual schemas.

From Enlightenment to Obscurantism

I will argue that in the early 1970s, simultaneously a spur in

Textbook definitions

Poppers accusation

In an interview with both Popper and Marcuse, Popper used the metaphor of the orakle of Delphi and Socrates to illustrate that 'knowing that you know nothing' is a goal to attain.

And here I can best formulate my main reproach against all modern Marxists as follows: Marxists think they know a lot. They are completely lacking in intellectual modesty. They show off their knowledge and use impressive terminology. This reproach does not apply to Marx or Engels. They were great, original thinkers with new ideas, which were sometimes difficult to formulate. Anyone who has something new and important to say attaches great importance to being understood. And he will find it of the utmost importance to write as simply and comprehensibly as possible. Nothing is so easy as writing difficultly. But I accuse modern revolutionary Marxists of producing great arguments and of trying to impress us with few ideas and many words.²

²En ik kan hier mijn voornaamste verwijt tegen alle moderne marxisten het beste zó formuleren: de marxisten denken, dat ze veel weten. Het schort hun volledig aan intellectuele bescheidenheid. Zij pronken met hun kennis en met een imponerende terminologie. Dit verwijt gaat niet op voor Marx of Engels. Dat waren grote, oorspronkelijke denkers met nieuwe ideeën, die soms moeilijk te formuleren waren. Wie iets nieuws en belangrijks te zeggen heeft, hecht er grote waarde aan, dat hij begrepen wordt. En hij zal het van het grootste belang vinden zo eenvoudig en

Brennans self-incrimination

I found the term ‘Obscurantism’ used ‘in the wild’ by Timothy Brennan, critic, cultural theorist, activist and scholar at the University of Minnesota. In an interview with Philipp Felsch, author and professor at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin for the German quarterly magazine ‘Texte Zur Kunst’, Brennan reacts to a critical question. Professor Felch, who wrote a book on the development of Marxist thought in *Der lange Sommer der Theorie. Geschichte einer Revolte 1960–1990*, notes that Brennan’s thinking has closer resemblance to the *nouveaux philosophes* such as André Glucksmann or Bernard-Henri Lévy, than to the poststructuralism of Deleuze or Foucault, as Brennan states.

Instead of answering this critique, Brennan uses his position of interviewee and perhaps his higher status as a leverage to evade the critical question:

Well, I would of course object to that perception. I teach theory, am dedicated to a close familiarity with texts of the philosophical past. I’m not one of these people who sits on the outside of theory like a journalist, carping at obscurantism.³

Here, it would seem as if Brennan perceives Felch as ‘journalist, carping at obscurantism’. For this reason, Brennan does not feel the obligation to react directly at the critique of professor Felch. Rather, he goes on to self-accolade:

I get into the nitty-gritty and read things in their original languages and try to be as faithful as I can.

Here, it would seem as if reading philosophers ‘in their original language’ alone makes professor Brennan a better professor than professor Felch. Moreover, it seems to suggest that it is worthy of a medal to have read philosophers in their original language, even in the context of an interview in a magazine that is dedicated to text, art and social theory.

begrijpelijk mogelijk te schrijven als maar mogelijk is. Niets is zo gemakkelijk als moeilijk schrijven. Maar ik beschuldig de moderne revolutionaire marxisten ervan, dat zij geweldige betogen opzetten en er op uit zijn met weinig ideeën en veel woorden indruk op ons te maken.

Life and times of Herbert Marcuse

November 1918

The 1950s: communism in the U.S.A.?

The Constructive Forces of Mankind

The 1960s: the invention of the University

The goldrush

Is Marx Marxist?

Capitalism, Fascism, Marxism

A new struggle

Where are the farms and factories?

The invention of the Middle Class

Who is afraid of the Middle Class?

Disney is the enemy

A new kind of Capital

Critical theory as a lifestyle

Engagement as a currency

The Artist-Academic-Activist continuüm

The institutions of Cultural Capitalism

Cultural institutions function as both gatekeepers and catalysts in the broader framework of cultural capitalism. They conserve the past while shaping the future, navigating the demands of tradition and the pressures of innovation. The role of these institutions—museums, concert halls, theaters, universities—has been continuously redefined by ideological shifts, particularly as cultural markets become entangled with political activism. The intersection between aesthetic value and social critique is no longer an occasional overlap but an expectation, a demand placed upon cultural institutions to participate in broader political discourse.

A clear illustration of this dynamic is found in the contemporary landscape of classical music. Historically seen as an elite domain, classical music struggles to reconcile its past with the expectations of the present. As illustrated in *Rekto Verso's* 104th edition, engagement with social issues is seen as an imperative rather than an option. This cultural shift is personified by figures such as Djuwa Mroivili, whose career straddles activism, academia, and artistic performance. When Mroivili notes that they wrote a thesis on the political activism of Black women such as Nina Simone and Beyoncé, it signals a broader transition within cultural institutions: research is no longer simply about history or technique but about the politics of representation and resistance.

This transformation challenges the longstanding separation between art and politics, dismantling the notion of *l'art pour l'art*. In contemporary discourse, silence itself has become an active stance. Mroivili critiques the classical music world for its failure to engage politically, arguing that its reluctance to take positions on issues such as Palestine reflects a “performance of neutrality.” Silence is thus no longer an absence but a presence—a deliberate act of disengagement that is read as complicity. As John Cage famously stated, “there is no such thing as empty time .. there is always something to hear.” The refusal of concert halls and conservatories to participate in political discourse is itself a cultural statement, positioning them as conservative strongholds within an otherwise politically charged artistic landscape.

Who isn't a journalist?

What is art?

It's the critic, stupid!

Minister, are you listening?

Too loved to fail

Preaching change

Conservative socialism

How to get funds

The expectation of cultural institutions to engage is reinforced by institutional structures themselves. Mroivili's role extends beyond performance and academia into advisory panels and cultural funding bodies, reflecting how power circulates through networks of influence. Here, cultural capital merges with political capital: participation in panels and funding councils enables figures like Mroivili to shape the very criteria by which cultural engagement is measured and rewarded.

Communes of commerce

Silence as art

When money talks back

Chop, chop, Chopin!

The Middle Class as the cultural proletariat

Why the left hates revolutions now

Performative protest

The Therapeutical Turn

Why we are (not) Freudian

Is Id a science?

The Psychoanalysis of social theory

The Psychoanalysis of science

The Psychoanalysis of the arts

The Psychoanalysis of society

Lene Auestad, research fellow at the university of Oslo, contributes to the discussion in a way where both traces of social theory and psycho-analysis are to be found. Social problems are re-evaluated as psychological problems. In this way, psycho-analysis can be used to analyse society.

“In this way, a social majority or stronger party possesses a power of definition, to decide what is real, what counts, and whose experiences are valid” (Auestad, 2015, p. 291).

Here, we see there is not really a limit to the power of imagination, there is just power, and imagination.

“whereas the person assumed to be ‘normal’ is allowed to remain unconscious of his or her lack of acceptance of the other” (p. 292).

This unconsciousness is not simply an absence of awareness but an active refusal to recognize alternative perspectives. It is, in a psychoanalytic sense, a form of repression—one that maintains the comfort of those in power while delegitimizing the discomfort of those who challenge their assumptions.

“inherent in the common response of the racist, antisemite, misogynist or homophobe: ‘My statement was not intended to be hurtful. You must be hypersensitive. You misunderstand me.’, is a similar structure to the one seen in Balint’s account of trauma... the reality of the occurrence is denied... the blame is allocated to the recipient” (p. 290).

This response functions as a psychological defense mechanism, allowing the perpetrator to absolve themselves of responsibility while simultaneously invalidating the lived experience of the victim. By shifting blame onto the affected party, the structure of exclusion is maintained under the guise of rationality and neutrality.

This mechanism extends beyond interpersonal interactions into broader social and political discourse. When marginalized groups speak out against systemic oppression, they are often accused of exaggerating or fabricating their claims. The demand for ‘objective proof’ of discrimination ignores the fact that systemic power functions precisely by making its own operations appear natural and invisible. This erasure is not accidental but a necessary condition for the maintenance of hierarchical social structures. By pathologizing resistance—labeling it as irrational, overly

emotional, or misguided—the dominant order ensures that real critique is defanged before it can become a genuine threat.

Auestad's insights challenge us to reconsider how societies construct and maintain legitimacy. The psychoanalysis of society reveals that the struggle for justice is not only about economic redistribution or political rights but also about the right to have one's reality recognized. If power is, in part, the ability to define what counts as truth, then resisting oppression requires not just political activism but a reconfiguration of the structures of perception themselves. The task, then, is to dismantle the unconscious biases that sustain these exclusions, making visible what has been systematically rendered invisible.

The Psychoanalysis of the past

Conscienceness as a motive

Confessions of Cultural Capitalists

Vincent Croone

Laurence Schertz

Willem de Wolf

In analyzing the childish self-image of cultural capitalists, an essay by Willem de Wolf in *De Witte Raaf* (2023) provides a poignant illustration of the tensions between artistic dedication and the rejection of conventional adulthood. De Wolf, reflecting on his career as an actor, expresses regret over his decision not to have children, a decision shaped by his belief that an artistic life was incompatible with the traditional family life. This regret is not simply personal but speaks to a broader cultural tendency within intellectual and artistic circles, one in which adulthood and the responsibilities that come with it are increasingly rejected in favor of a more childlike pursuit of creativity and individual freedom.

De Wolf writes,

*"Thus, [the artist] became a loyal follower of the romantic artist adage that dominated the 1980s, which prescribed that family life, or any life outside of the arts, should not be pursued."*⁴

This statement points to the an artistic ethos which rejected traditional adult responsibilities in favor of an all-consuming commitment to art. In this context, de Wolf's reflection on his decision to forgo family in favor of his career illustrates a cultural shift in which childhood or the refusal to "grow up" is often seen as a radical act of artistic and intellectual purity.

4"en werd daarmee een trouwe volger van het in de jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw overheersende romantische kunstenaarsadagium dat voorschreef dat een gezinsleven, sowieso een leven naast de kunsten, beter niet kon worden nagestreefd" (p. 14).

This rejection of family and conventional adulthood aligns with the broader cultural trend of cultural capitalism, where those within the intellectual or artistic elite embrace a form of puerility, refusing adult obligations in favor of personal and artistic freedom. The desire to remain childlike can be interpreted not just as an aesthetic choice, but as a political act—a rejection of bourgeois values and societal expectations.

De Wolf also touches on the critical gaze of this artistic generation, stating,

*"It was part of a critical gaze towards society, parents, the church, the institutions, the bourgeoisie, and all forms of petty-bourgeois coercion and authority, all of which still needed to be fought."*⁵

This passage reveals that, for many artists and intellectuals, rejecting adult responsibilities was not only a personal decision but also a resistance to the dominant societal structures of authority. In this framework, the artist's refusal to grow up becomes a form of revolutionary resistance to bourgeois constraints. Note how 'society' and 'parents' are featuring next to each other, reflecting a marxist-freudian dichotomy.

Cultural capitalists reject traditional adulthood because it symbolizes the very structures they aim to subvert—such as family, work, and institutional authority. In doing so, they embrace an alternative, childlike existence, one that prioritizes creativity and intellectual exploration over material and familial responsibilities.

De Wolf further explores this dynamic, noting that art and creativity were seen as spaces where a childlike freedom could be fully realized. He writes,

"The self-insights that art would provide, the companionship it would grant, the home, solidarity, and also the other side, the super-sensible, the transcendent, all of which justify the monomaniacal pursuit and the rejection of the further, like children."

This reflects how the pursuit of art is justified by the promise of transcendence and the creation of alternative forms of solidarity, similar to the child's pursuit of meaning without the constraints of adulthood. In this context, the child's uncomplicated view of the world, driven by desire and fantasy, mirrors the intellectual and artistic dedication to pure creativity.

De Wolf's reflection on the artistic world's embrace of childishness points to a widespread desire to avoid maturity, a theme that runs deep in both the personal decisions of artists and the broader social and intellectual culture. The rejection of conventional adult roles is framed not just as a personal choice but as a righteous pursuit—one that is about seeking something greater, something transcendent and pure, similar to the desires often attributed to children. This is a powerful insight into how the artistic world creates spaces where childishness is not just tolerated but celebrated as a form of radical resistance to the structures of traditional adulthood.

De Wolf poignantly expresses his regret, writing,

⁵"het hoorde bij een kritische blik op de samenleving, de ouders, de kerk, de instituten, de bourgeoisie, alle vormen van kleinburgerlijke dwang en autoriteit, die allemaal nog bestreden moesten worden" (p. 14).

"Maybe it is one of the reasons why I—very childishly—want to stay a child, even in art, because only a child can say ‘you promised it!’”⁶

This passage reveals a deep psychological tension between the artist's childlike refusal to mature and the unfulfilled promises of a world that prioritizes adult responsibility over creative freedom.

This line encapsulates the internal conflict that de Wolf faces as an artist—a regret for not having a family, yet a recognition that his childish pursuit of art is tied to an idealization of youth and freedom. The statement reflects the naïve hope that the adult world would deliver on its promises, but also reveals the inability to fully embrace adult responsibilities, especially in the context of the cultural capitalist artist's world, where personal freedom is prioritized over familial or social obligations.

Finally, de Wolf reflects on the broader political and social implications of the 1980s artistic ethos, noting that the rejection of traditional adulthood was tied to the creation of alternative forms of living. He writes,

"While much of what was propagated in the 1980s was about creating an alternative that was not limited to the arts, it was about political and human connections, other forms of living and working together, other ways of learning and growing up—different from the own child and solitary family happiness.”⁷

This passage encapsulates the ambition of the 1980s to create a radically different world—one that was not confined to the traditional boundaries of family life or conventional adulthood. The desire to remain childlike or create alternative forms of living was not just a personal matter but part of a larger political and artistic vision for a world that would reject traditional, familial, and bourgeois structures.

Conclusion: Childishness as a Mode of Cultural Capitalism

De Wolf's essay provides a compelling foundation for understanding the childish self-image within cultural capitalism. His reflections highlight how the desire to remain childlike—a refusal to embrace conventional adulthood—can be seen as a political and aesthetic stance. This rejection of responsibility is not just about personal freedom, but about a broader cultural shift in which artists, intellectuals, and activists see themselves as free from the constraints of traditional, bourgeois life. In this context, cultural capitalism becomes a system that thrives on discursive power, where the refusal to mature is not only tolerated but celebrated as part of a radical, creative, and intellectual freedom that rejects the world of traditional responsibility and adult obligations.

6"Misschien is het een van de redenen waarom ik – heel kinderachtig – kind wil blijven, ook in de kunst, omdat alleen een kind kan zeggen ‘jullie hadden het beloofd!’” (p. 14).

7“terwijl toch ook veel van wat in de jaren tachtig werd gepropageerd ging om het creëren van een alternatief dat niet tot de kunsten beperkt bleef. Het ging in politieke en menselijke zin om andere verbindingen, andere vormen van samenleven en samenwerken, andere manieren van leren en opgroeien – anders dan het eigen kind en het solitaire gezinsgeluk” (p. 14).

James Lindsay

Conclusions

Quotes

Rekto Verso, editie 104: klassiek. Dit is magazine voor cultuur en KRITIEK. Het is een “gratis kwartaalblad dat de wereld beschouwt vanuit kunst en cultuur. Het biedt cultuurliefhebbers een verdiepende blik op film, podium, muziek, literatuur en beeldende kunst”

“Die terughoudendheid bij de publiekswerking verraadt dat er in de klassiekemuziekwereld nog steeds een restje van een essentialistische visie rondwaart” (P17, Evelyne Coussens, *Klassiek en Publiek*, zoeken naar verbeelding)

“Cultuuroverheden probeerden de afgelopen decennia de legitimiteit van cultuursubsidies en de autoriteit van culturele initiatieven te koppelen aan participatiegraad of simpelweg aan bezoekersaantallen”, zo schrijft Coussens op P19

“Omdat enkel daarin het duurzame, betekenisgevende werk wordt verricht dat consumenten tot publieken maakt”

“In this way, a social majority or stronger party possesses a power of definition, to decide what is real, what counts, and whose experiences are valid” (page 291)

“whereas the person assumed to be ‘normal’ is allowed to remain unconscious of his or her lack of acceptance of the other” (page 292)

“inherent in the common response of the racist, antisemite, misogynist or homophobe: “ My statement was not intended to be hurtful. You must be hypersensitive. You misunderstand me.”, is a similar structure to th eone seen in Balint’s account of trauma....the reality of the occurrence is denied... the blame is allocated to the recipient”. (page 290)

Bibliography

Canning, Susan M. 2023. *The Social Context of James Ensor’s Art Practice: Vive la Sociale*. London: Bloomsbury.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1970. *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: Basic Books.

Page 4 “The emergence of sociology, between the 1940s and 1960s, as part of popular culture”

“Hundreds of thousands of American college students took courses in sociology”

“at the same time, the newly emerging paperback book industry made these available as mass literature”

Stark, Franz. 1971. *Herbert Marcuse/Karl Popper. Sociale Revolutie/Sociale Hervorming. Een Confrontatie*. Translated by A. Kreykamp. Baarn: Wereldvenster.

Walgraffe-Vanden Broucke, Ria, Martine Stassin, and Claudine Vanderborgt, eds. 2015. *Psychoanalyse in Bewogen Tijden. Psychoanalyse in Beweging. La Psychoanalyse en des Temps Mouvementés. La Psychanalyse en Mouvement: Jubileumcongres | Colloque du 50e Anniversaire, Brussel 29-30.05.2015*. Brussels: Belgische School voor Psychoanalyse / École Belge de Psychanalyse.

De Wolf, Willem. 2023. “De Vuurwerkjongen.” *De Witte Raaf*, 38(1): pp. 14-15.